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Abstract
Companies that operate digital platforms are
growing rapidly. Theoretical and empirical research
has largely explored digital platforms in the context
of digital-native companies. Only a small set of
research explores how incumbent firms transition
into the platform economy. However, this stream of
research has studied incumbents under the
assumption that they can either build a platform or
join an existing platform. In contrast, the results of
our multiple case study demonstrate that incumbents
pursue multiple platform strategies simultaneously
and that their strategic options range from building
and joining a platform over investing in and
acquiring a platform to using white-label platforms.
The white-label strategy uses the platform technology
of a white-label platform owner to match the users of
the incumbent with the complementors of the whitelabel platform. Based on the results, which further
illustrate the motivations to pursue each strategy, we
discuss strategic differences between asset-heavy and
asset-light incumbents.

1. Introduction
Six out of the ten most valuable brands in 2019
were launched by platform companies [1], several of
which had existed for a surprisingly short time. By
leveraging the generativity of their ecosystems [2],
platform companies are disrupting traditional
business landscapes by changing well-known
business processes such as the creation of value, and
expectations of consumers [3, 4].
To compete in the platform economy, incumbent
companies must rethink their business models [5] and
find new ways of creating value for their customers
[6]. Otherwise, they might ultimately be displaced by
new and rapidly growing platform companies [7].
However, incumbents face several challenges when
entering the logic of platform ecosystems. On the one
hand, they are accustomed to controlling all aspects
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of their business, such as the supply chain,
distribution, and customer relationships [6, 7]. On the
other hand, they are less agile than their new digitalnative competitors, because their change is slowed
down by organizational rigidity and structural inertia
[8]. To combat the disruptive platform competition,
incumbents are increasingly adopting platform
thinking [9, 10] and establishing new platform
ecosystems [5, 6]. Incumbents from highly diverse
industries, such as banking, insurance, healthcare,
transportation, steel distribution, and energy, are
beginning to embrace platform business models [11,
12].
Although research on digital platforms made
significant advances on the dynamics of platform
emergence, platform orchestration, as well as
platform strategies and platform competition (see [13,
14] for an extensive review), theoretical and
empirical work has largely explored digital platforms
in the context of young digital platforms [15, 16].
Only a small set of research explores how incumbent
firms transition into the platform economy and how
they need to change to benefit from platform
economics [5, 7, 10, 17-19].
However, this stream of research has studied
incumbents under the assumption that they can either
build a platform or join an existing platform [3, 6],
neglecting that incumbents can pursue multiple
strategies (e.g. building and joining simultaneously).
In addition, incumbents’ platform strategies are
largely investigated around the building and joining
strategy, neglecting that incumbents also invest in
platforms, acquire platforms, and utilize white-label
platforms. To shed more light on platform strategies
of incumbents, we pose the following research
question: What strategies do incumbents follow
towards participation in the platform economy, and
what are their motivations?
To this end, we conduct a multiple case study
with three incumbent firms from the chemical,
construction, and banking industry. Our study makes
two contributions. First, we extend the existing
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platform literature by empirically investigating the
perspectives of incumbents. Second, and more
specifically, we contribute to the discussion on how
and why incumbent firms transition into the platform
economy. Our results demonstrate that platform
strategies cannot always be reduced to a simple
build-or-join decision. In contrast, incumbents pursue
multiple platform strategies at the same time. Their
strategic options range from building and joining a
platform over investing in and acquiring a platform to
leveraging white-label platforms (that is, using the
platform technology of a white-label platform owner
to match the users of the incumbent with the
complementors of the white-label platform). The two
asset-heavy companies in our study largely draw on
investing and joining strategies to avoid antitrust
issues and build new sales channels. In contrast, the
asset-light company is particularly engaging in the
building and white-label strategy to remain in control
of customer access and market-level data. All case
companies agreed that it is crucial to enter the
platform economy to pre-empt external companies
from building strategically relevant positions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 analyzes the literature on platform
strategies for incumbents and Section 3 describes our
methodology. In Section 4, we present the intra-case
analyses of three incumbents and in Section 5 the
cross-case analysis. The paper concludes and presents
limitations and future research in Section 6.

2. Theoretical Background
2.1 Digital Platform Ecosystems
Digital platforms have received significant attention
from
economics,
technology
management,
information systems, and strategic management [13,
14]. Although different definitions of the term digital
platforms exist across disciplines, the consensus is
that digital platforms provide the basis for
complementary products and services that can be
developed and offered on the platform by third
parties [8, 20]. Drawing from Evans and Gawer
(2016) [21] and Cusumano, Gawer, and Yoffie
(2019) [6], we distinguish between two distinct
platform business models: innovation platforms and
transaction platforms. An innovation platform refers
to the technological foundation (e.g. iOS) on which
complementors (e.g. software developers) develop
complementary innovations (e.g. applications).
Together with users, an innovation platform and its
complementors form a platform ecosystem. A
platform ecosystem describes a not fully
hierarchically controlled coordination structure that

integrates different actors through the directions set
by a central company [22]. A transaction platform
facilitates transactions between sellers and buyers
(e.g. e-commerce platforms such as Amazon
Marketplace or eBay) who would otherwise have
difficulty finding each other. Platform owners refer to
companies that exercise intellectual property rights
and develop the technology of the platform. Platform
providers refer to companies that represent users’
primary point of contact with the platform [23].
Platform orchestrators refer to companies that are
entitled to orchestrate the ecosystem by setting
governance rules. Some companies pursue multiple
roles. For instance, Google owns the platform
Android and is also entitled to its orchestration while
Samsung represents the platform provider as it sells
the platform through its smartphone to users. In the
present paper, we use the term platform owner to
describe companies that reflect owners, providers,
and orchestrators and the term platform provider
(orchestrator) to describe companies that only
provide (orchestrate) the platform.

2.2 Platform Strategies
The first strategy describes that an incumbent can
enter the platform economy by investing in a digital
platform separated from its organizational structure
[24]. When following this strategy, the incumbent has
two options. Either creating and investing in a spinoff (option A) or investing in an existing platform
company (option B). Both options allow the
incumbent to gain experience and learn about the
platform’s business model, success factors, and
changing customer behaviors without having to adapt
its existing business model. Hence, the incumbent
can reap the benefits of what Zhang et al. (2018) call
the Invest-Learn-Act strategy [18]. The disadvantage
of this strategy is that the incumbent can’t fully
control the development of the platform and that the
platform might move into directions detrimental to
the incumbent’s strategy. However, the higher the
investment, the more control can be exercised.
The second strategy describes that an incumbent
can enter the platform economy by building a digital
platform integrated into its organizational structure
[5]. For example, General Electric built an innovation
platform by opening up its Predix operating system to
external developers to harness complementary
innovations and to equipment manufacturers to
increase the side of application users [6]. Building a
platform is advantageous when the market is
relatively new and existing actors or technologies are
not mature. The strategy also benefits the integration
of the platform into the incumbent’s existing
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strategy if it engages in at least two strategies (e.g.
build and join) or uses a strategy at least twice (e.g.
join two platforms). When an incumbent transitions
from one strategy to another, we consider both
exclusively pursuing the new strategy and pursuing
multiple strategies at the same time as a multiplatform strategy.1

3. Methodology
We designed a multiple case study incorporating
multiple semi-structured interviews and extensive
online research. The qualitative case study approach
is appropriate for investigating phenomena in a reallife context [26, 27]. We considered the perspective
of incumbent companies that had decided to build or
join one or more digital platform ecosystems. By
analyzing both inter-case and cross-case patterns, we
derived several industry-specific as well as some
overarching patterns.
To explore how incumbents strategize within
these rapidly changing environments, we chose a
mixed sample of three large organizations. The case
companies were selected under three essential
selection criteria: (1) incumbents in their industries,
meaning that the companies were established and
operating successfully in their industries, (2)
incumbents from different industries with different
levels of digital maturity to avoid industry bias [28],
and (3) incumbents that were actively involved in one
or more digital platform ecosystems (as defined by
Hein et al. [2]). The final sample comprised three
case companies, one operating within the
construction industry (a business-to-business [B2B]
industry), the second in the chemical industry (a B2B
industry), and the third in the banking industry (a
B2B/business-to-consumer [B2C] industry). All three
incumbents originated before 1960, employed
between 6,000 and 20,000 employees at the time of
the study, and collected revenues between 2 and 20
billion euros.
In total, we conducted 11 semi-structured expert
interviews. To strengthen the credibility of the
results, we triangulated the interview data with
additional secondary data as the main source of
empirical material (see Table 1) [29].
Firm

ChemistryC
o

structure and permits it to establish a keystone or
leadership position in the market. The keystone
position provides the opportunity to take advantage
of network effects and to access market-level data,
which can be used to enter the complementary or a
new market more easily. However, the building
strategy's challenges are that it is costly, timeintensive, and requires cooperation from other
companies [10, 25]. To succeed, firms generally need
deep pockets and a long-time horizon. Maybe even
more challenging is that managers have to solve
various platform challenges (e.g. build an installed
base, pricing on each side, and governance
mechanisms [19] and need to overcome the mindset
of command and control [10, 17].
The third strategy describes that an incumbent can
enter the platform economy by acquiring a digital
platform and integrating it into its organizational
structure [6]. That is, for example, the case for
AccorHotels, who integrated the Onefinestay
platform to be able to offer luxury properties in
London to compete against emerging platforms
within the hotel industry such as Airbnb [6]. The
main advantage of acquiring a platform is that timeto-market is strongly reduced. However, this strategy
requires incumbents to have mastered new, platformspecific management skills [19] such as facilitating
open innovation and stimulating economic activity
without exercising tight control. The challenge of
buying a platform is to retain key talent, integrate the
platform into legacy systems, and counteract cultural
rejection [6].
The fourth strategy describes that an incumbent
can enter the platform economy by joining a thirdparty digital platform [6]. When following this
strategy, the incumbent has three options. They can
join the supplier/complement producer side (option
A), join the buyer/consumer side (option B), or join
both sides as “prosumer” (option C). Joining a
platform creates the opportunity to profit from
platform economics such as increased reach and
lower costs. However, once the third-party platform
has become successful and established a dominant
position, it might turn to become the incumbent’s
largest competitor. In the last years, it has been
common for Amazon to act as a retailer on its
marketplace and for Apple to compete with
complementors on its innovation platform. Especially
if the incumbent has not invested in the platform, it
has almost no possibilities to influence the platform’s
decisions to its own advantages (exceptions are key
complementors who are crucial to the platform’s
success).
Based on the proposed platform strategies, we
argue that an incumbent uses a multi-platform

1

List of qualitative data
CEO (Chemical Marketplace) (38:33 min)
CDO (ChemistryCo) (1st 32:16 min, 2nd 15:00 min)
Business Development Manager (Chemical Marketplace)
(43:44)
CIO (ChemistryCo) (38:10 min)

We thank the anonymous reviewer for this comment
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2 public interviews with CDO (ChemistryCo)
2 public blog posts describing platform trends within the
industry

ConstructionCo

CEO (Product-finder Platform) + Head of Digital Innovation
Lab (ConstructionCo) (53:30 min)

4.1. Case 1: ChemistryCo

Member of Digital Board (ConstructionCo) (56:39 min)
Head of Business Development IoT (ConstructionCo) (45:38
min)
Leader Business Unit Smart Building (ConstructionCo) (26:31
min)
1 Press release about the company
1 Blog posts describing platform trends within the industry
Head Digital Commercial Offering & Processes (BankCo)
(41:55 min)
Product manager of Transaction Platform 2 (BankCo) (44:42
min)

BankCo

4. Results

Lead of Innovation Platform (BankCo) (27:58)
5 public interviews with/ self-authored articles of the lead of the
innovation platform (BankCo)
1 public speech of the company CEO (BankCo)
1 public interview with the company CDO (BankCo)
1 public interview with the white-label platform CEO
7 press releases/ News articles on incumbent’s platform strategy
4 Blog posts describing platform trends within the industry

Table 1: List of qualitative data

We analyzed the interview transcripts and
additional selected data sources following the
grounded theory methodology [30]. First, 168 open
codes were generated from the transcripts and the
data used for triangulation. Second, the similarities
among the codes obtained by open coding were
identified by axial coding. Consequently, 22
subcategories were grouped into eight categories.
Table 2 is an example of the coding scheme.
Interview
statement
and
exemplary
open
codes
(underlined)
In the end, one concluded that it
is unlikely that these offers will
actually be successful afterwards,
it is perhaps more likely that
someone like Amazon, eBay, or
Google will discover the whole
thing for themselves1). Then let's
rather build something from
within the chemical industry that
bundles these areas of expertise,
as I said earlier, but then
operates independently2).

Subcategories

Categories

1) Pre-empt
external
platform
companies

1)
Incumbent
motivation

2) Industry
acceptance

2) Reason
for spin-off

Table 2: Illustration of a coding scheme

Through an intra-case analysis, we investigated in
detail the motives for the different platform strategies
pursued by incumbents entering the platform
economy and related them to the companies’
industries. In the discussion, we elaborate on the
differences and similarities among the pursued multiplatform strategies, along with their driving
motivations.

Case description. ChemistryCo is an established,
globally operating incumbent, leading a specific area
of the specialty chemicals industry. Various sources
confirmed the low digital maturity of this chemical
industry. Until recently, only a small number of
digital platforms have existed in this industry, leaving
opportunities for introducing new platform
ecosystems [31]. A few years ago, ChemistryCo
started a digital transformation initiative focused on
the development of digital business models along the
value chain. Out of this initiative, the company
founded a digital platform startup that developed a
transaction platform called Chemical Marketplace.
This platform connects buyers of chemicals to
chemical suppliers of all sizes. It also plans the
provision of additional services based on analytics.
The incumbent is taking further platform initiatives;
for example, the first considerations on an innovation
platform are being formulated as part of the
company’s R&D.
ChemistryCo’ multi-platform strategy. The
company initiated the development of the Chemical
Marketplace transaction platform, which was built by
a new separated platform organization. Hence,
ChemistryCo became the investor of the created spinoff. After birthing the idea of an online marketplace
for the chemical industry, the market was screened
for existing solutions. The analysis at that time
revealed no adequate platform in the western area.
ChemistryCo decided to fill this gap and build
something new.
We identified that the company had three reasons
to separate the platform as a spin-off. The most
commonly reported reason for separating the
platform from the organization is industry
acceptance. The incumbent soon realized that unless
the platform was independent and separated from the
parent company, “[Chemical Marketplace] would
have become an extended sales arm of
[ChemistryCo], not accepted by the market and then
you are not a marketplace” (CDO, ChemistryCo).
For this reason, the data worlds of the two companies
are completely separated and ChemistryCo is not
treated differently from other participants of the
ecosystem. Second, “according to the antitrust laws
of most countries, you are not allowed to sell
complementary competing products on your own
webshop. Because then, you would gain insight into
customer relations, prices, and quantities and that is
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an antitrust” (CIO, ChemistryCo). Article 101 of the
TFEU prohibits “agreements between undertakings”
that can prevent or restrict competition [32]. When
platform owners compete with complementors on the
platform, they can potentially gain insights into
competitively sensible information (e.g. prices),
which might violate the above principle. To prevent
the flow of information contrary to antitrust law,
incumbents tend to spin off their platform operations
as separate platform companies [33]. The third reason
for separation was to cope with the different culture
and competencies needed to operate the new
platform. Separation from the founding company
enables the platform company to attract the required
workforce and achieve the required time to market.
“Everyone who worked there […] made a conscious
decision to work for a startup rather than for a large
chemical company and these are very different
working
environments”
(CEO,
Chemical
Marketplace).
ChemistryCo revealed two motivations for
investing in a spin-off. First, expecting that the
platform trend from the B2C sector will spill over
into the B2B sector, the company decided that by
initiating a platform from within the industry, they
could pre-empt platform startups or technology
companies from outside the industry. Second, as a
venture capital provider, ChemistryCo receives a
share of the platform’s revenues and aims to generate
a positive return on investment when selling its
shares.
However, ChemistryCo is not only the initiator
and investor of Chemical Marketplace but also joined
the platform as a complementor to use it as an
additional sales channel.
Besides joining the transaction platform of the
spin-off, the CDO also stated that: “When we sell in
regions where [Chemical Marketplace] is not active,
for example in China, we also use existing platforms
in these regions.”
In summary, ChemistryCo pursues multiple
strategies (investing in spin-off, joining the spin-off’s
transaction platform, and joining transaction
platforms of existing firms) at the same time in
contrast to pursuing exclusively one strategy after
another. While no synergies arise from joining
multiple transaction platforms,
ChemistryCo
leveraged synergies between investing in a spin-off
and joining the spin-off’s platform. That is, by
initiating and contributing to a new platform made by
industry insiders, ChemistryCo pre-empts external
companies from entering, which may represent a
form of strategic vulnerability or future risk [34].

4.2. Case 2: ConstructionCo
Case description. ConstructionCo is an
incumbent enterprise in the construction supply
industry, leading the field of building envelopes. As
the chemical industry, the construction industry is
very complex and has a low level of digital maturity:
“It's only been 1.5 years since the whole
digitalization process really began to feel an
upswing”
(Member
of
Digital
Board,
ConstructionCo). Yet some of the majors in the
industry, including ConstructionCo, have actively
engaged in digitization and investments in digital
companies and technology. A few years ago,
ConstructionCo created a digital roadmap, exploring
and developing digital solutions for different work
phases accompanying typical construction projects.
This
roadmap
inspired
ConstructionCo’s
manufacturer-independent product-finder transaction
platform (called Product-finder Platform), which
extends beyond the core business of the company.
The idea for this business model was then realized by
founding a spin-off. Besides, the company is
currently in the process of developing an IoT
platform.
ConstructionCo’s multi-platform strategy. The
company decided to create and invest in a separated
spin-off. The Product-finder platform enables a
manufacturer-independent comparison of building
products. Product-finder Platform satisfies our
definition of a transaction platform because it
digitally brings together planners and manufacturers.
As the reason for separation from the founding
company, ConstructionCo identified the need for
industry acceptance in the sense that “we wanted to
be a manufacturer-independent and neutral platform
(CEO, Product-finder Platform).
ConstructionCo revealed two motivations for
investing in a spin-off. First, to pre-empt invading
platform companies. According to the CEO of the
Product-finder Platform, it is better to “shape than be
shaped” as this strategic move allows to avoid high
margins, negative dependencies on possible external
platforms, and loss of control. As digital leaders, they
can better serve the interests of their industry.
Second, as an investor, ConstructionCo is also
entitled to a proportionate revenue share of the spinoff’s sales. In this respect, the company sees itself as
a strategic partner who aims to establish a long-term
business model in the market and a continuous
revenue stream for itself.
In addition to investing in a spin-off transaction
platform, ConstructionCo also joins the platform as a
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complementor by publishing its product information
on top of the platform. In order to reach customers in
geographic regions that the Product-finder platform
does not address, ConstructionCo participates in
transaction platforms of existing firms.
Moreover, ConstructionCo regularly screens the
market for potential startups and technologies to
invest in. Although this focus is not limited to
platform companies, ConstructionCo took a majority
stake in a transaction platform where architects and
building product manufacturers can inform and
exchange information about new products with
videos.
Lastly, ConstructionCo is currently developing an
Internet of Things (IoT) platform that will transfer the
building envelope to the digital world and serve as a
second business in addition to the traditional product
business. To avoid dependencies and high fixed
payments to external companies, and to ensure the
development of know-how within its own company,
ConstructionCo decided to build a new platform. The
IoT platform is currently restricted to internal
developers but might open up to third-party
developers in the future, potentially turning into an
innovation platform.
In summary, ConstructionCo pursues multiple
strategies (investing in a spin-off and an existing
firm, joining the spin-off’s platform and transaction
platforms of existing firms, and developing an
innovation platform) simultaneously in contrast to
pursuing exclusively one strategy after another.
ConstructionCo leveraged synergies between
investing in a spin-off and joining the spin-off’s
platform in the sense that ConstructionCo contributes
to the success of a platform made by industry
insiders. Hence, it pre-empts external companies
from entering the industry, which may represent a
future risk.

4.3. Case 3: BankCo
Case description. BankCo is an incumbent fullservice bank within the banking and financial
services industry. Its customers include private
clients, medium-sized companies, corporations, the
public sector, and institutional investors. As customer
expectations increase and more fintechs enter the
market, banks have been under pressure to digitize
for some time, so the industry is already digitally
mature. With the ongoing digitalization of the
industry and the blurring ecosystem boundaries,
platforms are increasingly becoming the method of
choice for incumbent financial services institutes,
especially in the retail and commercial banking
fields. Alongside the incumbents that are establishing

themselves as platform owners and orchestrators,
tech giants are gradually trying to invade the banking
business with their platforms. Consequent to these
developments, companies in the industry must decide
whether to build or join one or more platform
ecosystems. Our case company regards its customer
relationships as its core competency. For this reason,
it decided to become a platform owner and
orchestrator. During the last two years, our case
company has initiated and implemented numerous
platform-based
business
models,
including
transaction platforms and an innovation platform.
BankCo’s multi-platform strategy. BankCo has
built a marketplace on which it no longer offers only
its own financial products, but also external products
provided by complementors. On top of Transaction
Platform 1, BankCo offers several key services that
are supplemented by so-called “beyond banking”
offers, such as accounting tools provided by fintechs.
Hence, BankCo is simultaneously platform owner
and non-competing complementor of Transaction
Platform 1.
The company revealed four motivations for
building a transaction platform. By positioning itself
as a platform owner, BankCo can access the customer
data generated on the platform, and hence develop
new business models and implement new features.
The importance of this argument was heavily
emphasized: “We believe that what we learn from
these usage patterns and why a customer likes a
product from another bank, from another provider,
more than our own is worth much more than the few
100 product deals” (Head Digital Commercial
Offering & Processes, BankCo). Closely related to
the above motivation, BankCo stated no desire to
become a pure complementor because direct access
to its customers is necessary for customer retention
and must not be lost. “In the digital age, contact with
customers is only maintained by those who offer them
the best products, even if these are third-party offers”
(Vice Chairman of the Management Board, BankCo).
The company perceives tech giants, which also
position themselves as platforms within the banking
industry, as its greatest threat. Against this
concomitant threat, the company is accelerating the
pace of its own platform initiatives to pre-empt
industry outsiders from entry. By positioning itself as
a platform owner, BankCo also expects to increase its
margins: “Whoever has the customer access gets the
sales margin. And that grows from year to year. In
contrast, the pure producer margin is getting smaller
and smaller” (CDO, BankCo). This statement
demonstrates that besides leveraging platforms for
customer access (and hence gaining insights that
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improve the company’s offerings), the company
utilizes the platform’s mediation service as a
profitable business model.
In addition to Transaction Platform 1, BankCo
uses a white-label platform to provide Transaction
Platform 2, which customers can use to access
deposit products offered on top of the platform by
third parties. This white-label strategy describes the
establishment of a transaction platform that integrates
a white-label platform solution operated by an
external company, instead of developing the platform
infrastructure inhouse and from scratch. In our case,
the marketplace frontends of Transaction Platform 2
are connected to a separately running instance of a
white-label platform solution provided by a fintech.
The complementary banks that offer deposit products
are connected to the backend of the fintech platform.
This backend is connected to the incumbent’s
frontends, which represents the customer interface of
the platform. BankCo neither develops nor runs the
platform technology; instead, it provides and
orchestrates the platform. That means BankCo
provides the platform interface to match offers with
respective customers and is entitled to determine who
is allowed to offer its products on the platform.
To illustrate, see figure 1. At the center is the
white-label platform owner (fintech) who connects
complementary banks, who offer deposit products, to
its platform.
User
User

White-label
platform provider
and orchestrator

User

User

Complementor

White-label
platform owner

Complementor

User
User
User
User

White-label
platform provider
and orchestrator

Complementor

Figure 1: White-label platform strategy

In the simple case, the white-label platform owner
matches these complementors to users in the sense
that users can use the platform to decide which
deposit they want to receive. However, if the user has
no bank account for the complementary bank, she
needs to open a new one. In the worst case, she
would have to open multiple bank accounts to obtain
multiple deposits. In order to counteract this
inconvenience, the white-label platform owner
partners with other banks as these have the possibility
to use the user’s existing bank account to manage
multiple external deposits. Hence, users can access
various third-party deposit products under the
existing bank account without having to continuously
create and switch bank accounts. Instead, users can

handle deposit administration centrally. We termed
these “partner banks” as white-label platform
provider and orchestrator to illustrate that they
provide and orchestrate the white-label platform
under their own corporate brand2. As a result, the
white-label platform strategy connects an incumbent
who controls the user side with a platform company
who controls the complementor side by granting the
incumbent access to the platform.
In addition to the motivations identified for
building Transaction Platform 1, BankCo named
specific motivations for choosing the white-label
platform strategy. On the one side, the company
saves the costs of building a platform from scratch,
and on the other side, BankCo can leverage the
existing complementor ecosystem of the fintech to
immediately offer various third-party products.
Potential disadvantages of this strategy comprise
strategic dependency, lack of control over technology
development, and limited adoption of platform
technology know-how.
Besides engaging in two transaction platforms,
BankCo has built an innovation platform which
provides third-party complementors access to a wide
range of data and services via developer APIs. The
decision to build the innovation platform was
encouraged by the following motivations. First, the
innovation platform is seen as an enabler for the the
company's entire platform business model. By
providing open APIs, the bank allows third-party
developers to develop solutions that BankCo cannot
develop itself. Moreover, by providing the best offer,
the bank can differentiate itself from the competition,
maintain existing customers, and win new customers.
Second, BankCo financially participates in some of
the solutions developed on the platform, and hence
benefits from the growth of other companies.
Furthermore, BankCo regards the complementor
ecosystem of the innovation platform as a future
opportunity for gaining partners in its marketplaces.
Finally, BankCo monetizes the APIs, which reflects a
new source of revenue.
In summary, BankCo pursues multiple strategies
(building a transaction platform, joining the
transaction platform, building an innovation platform,
and using a white-label transaction platform) at the
same time in contrast to pursuing exclusively one
strategy after another. Although BankCo does not
leverage any synergies between platform strategies
2

Although the white-label platform owner neither provides the
platform interface to the users of the “partner bank” nor is he
entitled to its orchestration, we refer to him as owner as he
provides the platform to its own users which he is also entitled to
orchestrate.
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yet, the decision to join its Transaction Platform 1 as
a complementor can generate synergies (e.g.
preferential treatment of own complements) if
BankCo decides to compete with complementors.

5. Discussion
The results provide initial evidence that industry
characteristics influence platform strategies. In
particular, the results indicate that customer group
(B2B versus B2C), product type (physical product
versus digital service), and sector-specific regulation
influence the entry decision of industry outsiders,
which again influences incumbents’ platform
strategies. In the following, we will use the term
asset-heavy company (such as ChemistryCo and
ConstructionCo) to describe companies that operate
physical products in B2B industries and asset-light
company (such as BankCo) to describe companies
that offer digital services in B2C-oriented industries.
Industries that are characteristic by business
customers, physical products, and restrictive
regulation (such as the chemical and the construction
industry) are more likely to reduce new entry and
blurring industries, acting as significant barriers to
entry. For instance, business customers require longterm and individually negotiated contracts, which
reduce the applicability of standard prices and
deliveries primarily adopted in B2C industries.
Moreover, B2B markets have fewer customers than
B2C markets, which limits the total value that can be
extracted from network effects. While B2C industries
are rather characterized by consumer homogeneity
and significant network effects, within B2B
industries, it is more difficult for industry outsiders to
cope with the heterogeneity of business customers
and harness network effects. In terms of the product
type, producing physical products requires large
investments in production facilities and compensating
high variable costs. In contrast, digital services are
characterized by marginal costs converting to zero.
This is why it is less attractive and more difficult to
enter existing product industries than industries with
digital services. Lastly, sector-specific regulations
represent another factor that influences new entry and
blurriness of industries. On the one side, firms that
operate in highly regulated industries acquired
domain-specific knowledge such as reviewing
whether the customer is allowed to acquire dangerous
goods (e.g. chemical industry) or that products need
to be sold through tenders (e.g. construction
industries); knowledge which is difficult to obtain
and to convert into operation as a new entry. On the
other side, sector-specific regulation can also open an

industry to new entry, as in the case of the Payment
Service Directive in the financial industry.
To summarize, the results indicate that assetheavy companies operating in highly regulated
industries mainly pursue the invest and join
strategies. In contrast, the asset-light company, which
was recently confronted with an opening of the
industry, follows the build and white-label strategies.
Based on the brief review of how industry
characteristics influence entry decisions, we argue
that asset-heavy companies significantly differ in
their platform strategies compared to asset-light
companies because they are less threatened by
external firms gaining control over the industry’s
value chain. We observe that companies within an
asset-heavy industry do not each aim to build a
platform and engage in platform competition with
other incumbents. In contrast, we observe that the
industry accepts one neutral platform and does not
aim to initiate competition on the platform level.
However, the industry characteristics are not the
only reasons why companies do not pursue the build
strategy. Another reason is that asset-heavy
companies largely perceive platforms as an additional
sales channel and less as “vehicle” to secure their
business in the future. Hence, if one platform already
exists for a specific market (mainly in terms of
geography), these companies decide to join the
platform instead of building a platform from scratch.
The last reason is that, at least in the European
Union, antitrust enforcement begins to prohibit
platform owners to also act as competing
complementors on their platforms. Hence, assetheavy companies risk regulatory intervention if they
sell their products on their platform, rendering the
building strategy unattractive. In order to counteract
the possibility that a “neutral” platform develops in
ways detrimental to the industry, some incumbents
invest in platforms to ensure that the platforms act in
the best interest of their respective industries.
Moving from asset-heavy industry to the assetlight industry, our findings illustrate that the assetlight company, which was recently confronted with
an opening of the industry, pursues significantly
different platform strategies; namely, the build and
white-label strategy. The motivation behind these
strategies can be attributed to the industry
characteristics (deregulation in form of PSD2, digital
services, and partially B2C), which reduce entry
barriers and increase the threat of external firms
gaining strategically relevant positions. That is, assetlight companies perceive a loss of control over
customer access and market-level data, two
components that critical to remain competitive and
innovative in the future [34]. As a consequence,
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asset-light companies are forced to compete on the
platform level. Figure two summarizes the different
platform strategies.
Asset-heavy industries (B2B)
(Platform economy not yet prevalent)
- Industry acceptance
law
! -- Antitrust
Different cultures and competencies

+

- Create an additional sales channel
- Pre-empt external platform companies
- Strategic investment

ChemistryCo
Investor: Invest in transaction platform
Option A: Create and invest in a spin-off

Complementor: Join transaction platforms
Option A: Join spin-off and other
transaction platforms as a supplier
ConstructionCo

! - Industry acceptance

Investor: Invest in transaction platform

- Pre-empt external platform companies

+ - Strategic investment

Option A: Create and invest in a spin-off

Complementor: Join transaction platforms
Option A: Join spin-off and other
transaction platforms as a supplier
Investor: Invest in transaction platform
Option B: Invest in existing platform
company

- Additional business

+ - Avoid dependencies

Owner: Build an IoT platform

- Ensure development of internal know-how
Asset-light industry (B2B and B2C)
(Platform economy on the rise)

- Control over customer access and market-data
- Best offering for customers

+ - Customer retention

- Maintain sales margin
- Defense against external platform competitors

BankCo

Owner and complementor: Build a
transaction platform

Provider & orchestrator:
Use a white-label transaction platform

savings
+ -- Cost
Existing partner ecosystem
- Best offeringing for customers

+ - Potential business partners

Owner: Build an innovation platform

- Monetization of APIs

!

: Reason for separation (spin-off)

+

: Motivation

Figure 2: Multi-platform strategies followed by our case
companies

6. Conclusions
Companies that operate digital platforms are
growing rapidly. Theoretical and empirical research
has largely explored digital platforms in the context
of digital-native companies. Only a small set of
research explores how incumbent firms transition
into the platform economy and how they need to
change to benefit from platform economics [5, 7, 10,
17-19]. However, this stream of research has studied
incumbents under the assumption that they can either
build a platform or join an existing platform.
In contrast, the results of our multiple case study
on three incumbent companies from the chemical,
construction, and banking industry demonstrate
different insights. First, incumbents pursue multiple
platform strategies simultaneously. They do not
pursue exclusively one strategy after another.
Second, platform strategies range from building and
joining a platform over investing in and acquiring a
platform to using white-label platforms. That is,
using the platform technology of a white-label
platform owner to match the users of the incumbent
with the complementors of the white-label platform.
Thus, the incumbent transitions into the role of a
platform provider and orchestrator without becoming

the owner of the platform. This strategy has the
advantage of saving development and maintenance
costs as well as immediately accessing an installed
base of complementors. However, potential
disadvantages include strategic dependency, lack of
control over technology development, and limited
adoption of platform technology know-how.
Moreover, our results provide initial evidence that
industry characteristics influence platform strategies.
We find that asset-heavy companies largely draw on
investing and joining strategies, whereas the assetlight company is particularly engaging in building
and white-label strategies. The invest and join
strategies are primarily motivated by avoiding
antitrust issues and building new sales channels. In
contrast, the build and white-label strategies are
mainly motivated by remaining in control over
customer access and market-level data. Either way,
all case companies agreed that it is crucial to enter
the platform economy to pre-empt external
companies from building strategically relevant
positions.
For managers of incumbent firms, the results have
three implications. First, the results demonstrate that
managers should consider pursuing multiple platform
strategies when transiting into the platform economy.
This way, they can satisfy different customer groups
and benefit from synergies. Second, the results
indicate that managers should carefully consider
whether they want to build a platform and join it as a
complementor. Our case companies decided against
this strategy as it reduces complementors acceptance
of the platform and might lead to antitrust issues.
Third, the new strategy of using a white-label
platform reflects a promising strategy for managers
who quickly need to solve the chicken-and-egg
problem, remain in control over the orchestration of
both sides, and do not want to build the platform
technology.
Because our study is qualitative, it is necessarily
limited by small sample size and low causal power.
For future research, we encourage (1) to investigate
other industries to extend our findings and draw
conclusions from comparing different multi-platform
strategies, (2) to consider how platform ownership
(by a single company, consortium, or peer-to-peer
network) influences multi-platform strategies, (3) to
understand the competitive strategies for emerging
winner-takes-all markets between native platform
companies and incumbents (e.g. in the mobile
payment context).
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